Cncl of Alternative Parties v. Hooks by unknown
1999 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-1-1999 
Cncl of Alternative Parties v. Hooks 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999 
Recommended Citation 
"Cncl of Alternative Parties v. Hooks" (1999). 1999 Decisions. 146. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/146 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
                      CNCL OF ALTERNATIVE v HOOKS 
 
Filed June 1, 1999  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
 
No. 98-5256  
 
THE COUNCIL OF ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL PARTIES, GREEN PARTY OF NJ, NATURAL 
LAW PARTY, NJ CONSERVATIVE PARTY, NJ LIBERTARIAN PARTY, US TAXPAYERS 
PARTY OF NEW JERSEY, ALBERT LAROTONDA, GARY NOVOSIELSKI, MADELYN 
HOFFMAN, JIM MOHN, MARY JO CHRISTIAN, JEFFREY M. LEVINE, TOM BLOMQUIST, 
BERNARD SOBOLEWSKI, SAL DUSCIO, ANNE STOMMEL, LEONARD FLYNN, JOHN PAFF, 
MICHAEL BUONCRISTIANO, EMERSON ELLETT, CHARLES NOVINS, LOWELL T. 
PATTERSON, EUGENE R. CHRISTIAN, SCOTT JONES, RICHARD S. HESTER, SR., 
BARBARA 
HESTER, AUSTIN S. LETT, ARNOLD KOKANS, LEONA LAVONE, SHIRLEY BONCHEFF, 
CHRISTIAN ZEGLER, VICTORIA SPRUIELL, HARLEY TYLER,  
 
v.  
 
LONNA R. HOOKS, Secretary of State of the State of New Jersey, in her 
official capacity and her 
successors, Appellant  
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW 
JERSEY (D.C. No. 97-cv-01966) (District Judge: Honorable Mary Little 
Cooper)  
 
Argued: November 4, 1998  
 
Before: SCIRICA, ALITO, Circuit Judges, and GREEN, Senior District Judge* 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
* The Honorable Clifford Scott Green, United States Senior District Judge 
for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.  
 
(Opinion Filed: June 1, 1999)  
 
PETER VERNIERO ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY JOSEPH L. YANNOTTI 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL OF COUNSEL DONNA KELLY (ARGUED) SENIOR 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL R.J. Hughes Justice Complex P.O. Box 112 Trenton, 
New Jersey 
08625  
 
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant  
 
LENORA M. LAPIDUS DAVID R. ROCAH (ARGUED) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
OF NEW JERSEY 35 Halsey Street, Suite 4B Newark, New Jersey 07102  
 
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees  
 OPINION OF THE COURT  
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal concerns the constitutionality of a provision of New Jersey's 
election law, N.J.S.A. § 19:13-9, 
that, as recently amended, requires independent and so-called "alternative 
political party" candidates seeking 
access to the general election ballot to file nominating petitions by the 
day of the primary election. Because 
we conclude that the filing deadline is a reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
regulation, justified by New Jersey's 
important regulatory interests, we reverse the decision of the District 
Court declaring § 19:13-9 
unconstitutional and enjoining its operation.  
 
I.  
 
The plaintiffs in this case -- the Council of Alternative Political 
Parties, various alternative political parties,1 
several candidates for elective office, and several voters -- commenced 
this action on April 8, 1997, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the filing deadline set out in 
N.J.S.A. § 19:13-9 (amended 
1999) imposed a"severe" burden on the right to vote, the right to free 
association, and the right to the equal 
protection of laws under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (See Amended 
Complaint, May 23, 1997, 
at 18-20). At that time, N.J.S.A.§ 19:13-9 required all candidates seeking 
a place on the general election 
ballot to file nominating petitions 54 days before the primary election. 
On May 9, 1997, the plaintiffs moved 
for a preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of State from 
refusing to accept nominating petitions 
submitted after the filing deadline.2 The District Court denied their 
motion on June 17, 1997, finding that 
although the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and would be 
irreparably harmed if relief were not 
granted, the State would be more severely harmed, and the public interest 
disfavored such relief.  
 
The plaintiffs filed a timely appeal on June 23, 1997, seeking an 
expedited review and an injunction pending 
appeal. This Court granted their request for expedited review and heard 
argument on July 21, 1997. Relying 
primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 
U.S. 780 (1983), a panel of this 
Court (the "prior panel") concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to 
succeed on the merits and that the 
remaining preliminary injunction factors favored granting their prayer for 
relief. 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
1. The alternative political parties in this case are the Green Party of 
New Jersey, the Natural Law Party, the 
New Jersey Conservative Party, the New Jersey Libertarian Party, and the 
U.S. Taxpayers Party of New 
Jersey. The Council of Alternative Political Parties is an unincorporated 
association that represents these 
alternative political parties.  
 
2. Since commencement of this action, the statutory electoral duties of 
the Secretary of State have been 
transferred to the Attorney General pursuant to an Executive 
Reorganization Plan. For convenience, we 
refer to the defendant as the "State." Council of Alternative Political 
Parties v. Hooks , 121 F.3d 876, 884 
(3d Cir. 1997). The prior panel therefore reversed the decision of the 
District Court and ordered the entry 
of preliminary relief in favor of the plaintiffs.3 Id. Pursuant to an 
interim consent order, the parties agreed to 
extend the 1998 filing deadline from April 9 to July 27, 1998.  
 
The plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment. Premising its ruling on 
the prior panel's decision and 
concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact, the 
District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion. 
See Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks , 999 F. Supp. 607 
(D.N.J. 1998). The State then 
took this appeal, and we heard argument on November 4, 1998. On December 
24, 1998, after we heard 
oral argument, the New Jersey Legislature amended section 19:13-9, 
effective January 1, 1999, so that 
nominating petitions are no longer due 54 days before the primary, as they 
were under the version of the law 
examined by the District Court and the prior panel, but are due by the day 
of the primary. In light of this 
amendment, we requested additional briefing from the parties on whether 
New Jersey's recently 
amendedfiling deadline violates plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. Although plaintiffs 
acknowledge that "the amended statute is an improvement over the former 
statute," they assert that "it 
continues to impose an unconstitutional burden on alternative political 
party candidates and is not justified by 
any legitimate state interest." Appellees' Supplemental Br. at 1. The 
State, on the other hand, asserts that the 
amended statute is "equally constitutional" to the prior statutory 
deadline and is "illustrative that New Jersey 
has a viable and open electoral process . . . ." Appellant's Supplemental 
Br. at 3.  
 
II.  
 
In determining whether New Jersey's amended filing deadline imposes an 
unconstitutional burden on 
plaintiffs' rights, we begin by examining New Jersey's ballot access 
scheme in its entirety. Williams v. 
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
3. Judge Scirica dissented, finding that plaintiffs had not established a 
likelihood of success on the merits. 
Hooks, 121 F.3d at 884-86. (1968); Rainbow Coalition of Oklahoma v. 
Oklahoma State Election Bd., 
844 F.2d 740, 741 (10th Cir. 1988).  
 
Under New Jersey law, the general election for candidates seeking 
statewide or local office takes place on 
the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, N.J.S.A. § 19:2-3, 
and the primary election takes 
place on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in June. See N.J.S.A. § 
19:2- 1; see also N.J.S.A. § 
19:1-1 (defining "primary election" as "the procedure whereby the members 
of a political party . . . nominate 
candidates to be voted for at general elections . . . ."). To obtain 
placement on the November general 
election ballot for statewide or local office, 4 a candidate may take one 
of the two mutually exclusive routes: 
the primary election process or the petition process.  
 
The first route, the primary election process, is available only to 
candidates representing a "political party," 
as defined under New Jersey's election law. See N.J.S.A. § 19:1-1. Under 
that law, a "political party" is any 
party that garners at least 10% of the votes cast in the last general 
election for the office of the member of 
the General Assembly. Id. At present, the only recognized political 
parties in New Jersey are the 
Democratic and Republican parties.  
 
Candidates participating in the primary election process begin their 
electoral involvement by filing nominating 
petitions at least 54 days before the primary election. See N.J.S.A. § 
19:23-14. Petition forms are made 
available in late December to early January, but candidates are free to 
create their own forms and to begin 
soliciting signatures at any time. See N.J.S.A. § 19:23-7 (contents of 
petition).  
 
The number of eligible voters required to sign a nominating petition 
varies, depending on the office sought. 
For instance, candidates running for Governor or United 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
4. Unlike candidates seeking statewide or local offices, candidates 
seeking the presidency must file a 
nominating petition with the requisite number of signatures 99 days before 
the general election. In 1997, the 
presidential filing deadline was July 28. The previous filing deadline was 
40 days before the primary election, 
but after Anderson this deadline was struck down as unconstitutional as 
applied to presidential elections. 
See LaRouche v. Burgio, 594 F. Supp. 614 (D.N.J. 1984). States Senator 
must obtain the signatures of 
1,000 voters. See N.J.S.A. § 19:23-8. The number of signatures required 
for candidates seeking other state 
offices is even less: generally, candidates need collect only 100 
signatures, and in some cases, 50 signatures 
is all that is required.5 See id. If the statutory requirements are met, 
candidates' names appear on the June 
primary election ballot, and if they are successful, their names are 
listed on the general election ballot.  
 
Candidates not affiliated with one of the "political parties" -- which we 
will call alternative political party 
candidates -- must make use of the petition process. See generally 
N.J.S.A. § 19:13-3 to 13 (formally 
designating petition process as "[d]irect nominations by petition").6 
Prior to the recent amendment, this route 
required alternative political party candidates, like the political party 
candidates, to file nominating petitions 
54 days before the primary election. The amended version, however, allows 
alternative political party 
candidates to file nominating petitions by the date of the primary. See 
N.J.S.A. § 19:13-9. In other words, 
while political party candidates must file their nominating petitions in 
early April, alternative political party 
candidates are given an additional 54 days in which to file, and thus 
their nominating petitions are due in early 
June.  
 
The other statutory requirements are generally the same as the ones 
applicable to political party candidates, 
but there are a few additional differences that require mention. First, 
alternative political party candidates 
may solicit signatures from all registered voters, regardless of their 
political affiliation. See N.J.S.A. § 
19:13-5. Second, alternative political party gubernatorial candidates are 
required to gather only 800 
signatures, whereas major party gubernatorial candidates, as previously 
noted, must 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
5. Because there are two candidates elected for each Assembly district, 
candidates seeking this state office 
can file a"joint petition," and therefore such candidates need obtain only 
50 signatures each.  
 
6. None of the alternative political parties in this action received 10% 
of the electoral vote at the last general 
election, and therefore none is a recognized "political party." As a 
result, they may nominate candidates only 
through the petition process. collect 1,000 signatures. Id. Last, upon 
meeting these requirements, alternative 
political party candidates bypass the primary election and proceed 
directly to the general election. 
Moreover, since New Jersey voters are always free to write in the name of 
the candidate of their choice, 
N.J.S.A. § 19:48-1(m), alternative political party candidates who are 
unable to have their names placed on 
the general election ballot through the statutory means discussed above 
may still participate in the election 
process as write- in candidates.  
 
III.  
 
At the outset, we reject plaintiffs' contention that this Court should 
remand the case to the District Court for 
an initial determination on whether the amended filing deadline violates 
plaintiffs' constitutional rights."The 
matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time 
on appeal is one left primarily to the 
discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of 
individual cases." Singleton v. Wulff, 428 
U.S. 106, 121 (1976); see also Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d 829, 833 n.11 (3d 
Cir. 1980) (exercising 
discretion to review issue not raised below). The issue involved in this 
case concerns a pure question of law, 
and in the interest of avoiding further delay, we conclude that this case 
represents an appropriate instance for 
us to exercise our discretion and address the matter in this appeal.  
 
Before addressing the merits of this case, we also consider plaintiffs' 
contention that the prior panel's 
decision, granting their request for preliminary injunctive relief, see 
Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, is the law of the 
case. The law of the case doctrine developed "to maintain consistency and 
avoid reconsideration of matters 
once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit." 18 Charles 
A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & 
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 3d § 4478 
at 788 (1981) (hereinafter, 
"Wright & Miller"). Under this doctrine, an appeals court should generally 
decline to reconsider an issue that 
another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same case. In re City 
of Philadelphia Litigation, 158 F.3d 
711, 717 (3d Cir. 1998); see also 18 Wright & Miller, § 4478, at 788 (1981 
& 1996 Supp.). We have 
recognized, however, that reconsideration is justified in extraordinary 
circumstances such as where: (1) there 
has been an intervening change in the law; (2) new evidence has become 
available; or (3) reconsideration is 
necessary to prevent clear error or a manifest injustice. In re City of 
Philadelphia Litigation, 158 F.3d at 718 
(citing Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium 
Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 
116 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also 18 Wright & Miller, § 4478, at 790. Here, we 
are presented with an 
intervening change in the law, and thus we are not now bound by law- of-
the-case principles to adhere to 
the prior panel's decision.  
 
In addition, while the law of the case doctrine bars courts from 
reconsidering matters actually decided, it 
does not prohibit courts from revisiting matters that are"avowedly 
preliminary or tentative." See Wright & 
Miller, § 4478, at 798. As the Supreme Court has explained:  
 
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative 
positions of the parties until a trial 
on the merits can be held. Given this limited purpose, and given the haste 
that is often necessary if those 
positions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily 
granted on the basis of procedures that 
are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the 
merits. A party thus is not required to 
prove his case in full at a preliminary-injunction hearing, and the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law made 
by a court granting a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on 
the merits. University of Texas v. 
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); 
see also New Jersey Hosp. 
Ass'n v. Waldman, 73 F.3d 509, 519 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that findings 
of fact and conclusions of law 
made on preliminary injunction motions do not bar courts from making 
contrary findings or conclusions at a 
final hearing); Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 967-68 (3d Cir. 
1992). And as we observed in 
United States v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), 974 F.2d 315, 330 (3d Cir. 1992): [A] 
trial court . . . is not bound by 
its decision or the appellate court's decision about preliminary relief. 
The burden of proof on a moving 
plaintiff is different on a motion for preliminary injunction. 
Additionally, a decision on a preliminary injunction 
is, in effect, only a prediction about the merits of the case.  
 
Local 560, 974 F.2d at 330 (citing Board of Trade v. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm'n, 605 F.2d 
1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980)); accord 
Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 394 
(explaining that there are "significant procedural differences between 
preliminary and permanent 
injunctions"); cf. ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84 
F.3d 1471, 1477 (3d Cir. 
1996) (en banc) (holding that the District Court erred in concluding it 
was bound by the appellate court's 
preliminary ruling). A court's preliminary ruling, therefore, "neither 
constitutes nor substitutes for an actual 
finding that [the movant] ha[s] succeeded on the merits and [is] entitled 
to permanent relief." Id. at 1477.  
 Here, the prior panel did not hold that the plaintiffs were entitled to 
succeed; instead, it concluded that they 
were likely to succeed. Hence, law-of-the-case principles do not dictate 
our decision, and we accordingly 
proceed to consider the merits of the case.  
 
IV.  
 
A. Although "the rights of qualified voters to cast their votes 
effectively" and "the rights of individuals to 
associate for political purposes" are "of the most fundamental 
significance under our constitutional structure," 
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992), they are not absolute. Munro 
v. Socialist Workers Party, 
479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986). The Supreme Court has observed that, "as a 
practical matter, there must be a 
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and 
if some sort of order, rather than 
chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes." Timmons v. Twin Cities 
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 
1364, 1369 (1997) (quoting Storer v. Brown , 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)). 
Therefore, states have broad 
power to enact election codes that comprehensively regulate the electoral 
process. Id. States must exercise 
this power, however, within the limits imposed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.7 Williams v. 
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968).  
 
Although ballot access statutes "inevitably affect[ ] -- at least to some 
degree -- the individual's right to vote 
and his right to associate with others for political ends," not all such 
restrictions are unconstitutional. 
Anderson , 460 U.S. at 788. Where the statute imposes only a minimal 
nondiscriminatory burden on minor 
parties, yet affords "reasonable access" to the ballot, it generally has 
been upheld. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438 
("[W]e have repeatedly upheld reasonable, politically neutral regulations 
that have the effect of channeling 
expressive activity at the polls."); accord Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9 
(noting that "generally applicable 
and evenhanded restrictions" ordinarily have been upheld).8 Conversely, 
election regulations have been 
invalidated where they "unfairly or unnecessarily burden[ ] the 
`availability of political opportunity.' " 
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793 (quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964 
(1982) (plurality opinion)). 
Under the Supreme Court's election jurisprudence, a state burdens the 
"availability of political opportunity" 
by enacting ballot access laws that unfairly discriminate 
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7. As in Anderson, "we base our conclusions directly on the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments and do not 
engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause analysis. We rely, however, 
on the analysis in a number of . . . 
prior election cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." 460 U.S. at 
786-87 n.7.  
 
8. See also Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) 
(upholding statute requiring parties to 
garner 1% of primary votes to obtain place on general election ballot); 
American Party of Texas v. White, 
415 U.S. 767 (1974) (upholding statute requiring minor party candidates to 
file nominating petitions with 
signatures of 1% of the vote for governor at the last general election); 
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 
(1974) (upholding statute requiring independent candidates to be 
politically disaffiliated for at least one year 
before declaring candidacy, reasoning that the State's interests were 
sufficiently compelling); Rosario v. 
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (upholding statute requiring voters 
affiliated with one party to wait 11 
months prior to voting for another party's candidate); Jenness v. Fortson, 
403 U.S. 431 (1971) (upholding 
statute requiring minor party candidates to file nominating petitions 
signed by 5% of previous election's 
voters). against minor parties9 or "absolutely" or "directly preclude" 
minor parties from gaining a place on the 
ballot. 10 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 1371 (upholding statute because it did 
not "exclude[ ] a particular 
group" from electoral participation, nor did it "directly preclude[ ] 
minor political parties from developing and 
organizing"); see also Williams, 393 U.S. at 25 (invalidating statute that 
made it "virtually impossible" for 
minor party candidates to gain access to the ballot).  
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[c]onstitutional challenges to 
specific provisions of [a state's] 
election laws" cannot be resolved by any "litmus-paper test" and that 
there is "no substitute for the hard 
judgments that must be made." Storer, 415 U.S. at 730. Nonetheless, the 
Anderson Court developed a 
balancing test for use in determining whether a ballot access statute is 
unconstitutional:  
 
[The Court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the 
asserted injury to the rights protected by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. 
It must then identify and evaluate 
the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the 
burden imposed by its rule. In passing 
judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of 
each of those interests, it also 
must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to 
burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after 
weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide 
whether the challenged provision is 
unconstitutional. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. Regulations imposing "severe" 
burdens must be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 1370. 
When the election regulation 
imposes a lesser burden, however, it need only be justified by important 
state regulatory interests. Id.; 
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (requiring election regulations to survive strict 
scrutiny in every case"would 
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9. Anderson, 460 U.S. 780; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).  
 
10. Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 
(1973); Bullock v. Carter, 
405 U.S. 134 (1972). tie the hands of States seeking to assure that 
elections are operated equitably and 
efficiently").  
 
B. Before engaging in this balancing analysis, we must address the 
plaintiffs' argument that the outcome in 
this case is squarely governed by the Supreme Court's Anderson decision. 
While we agree that Anderson 
and its balancing test are relevant to our analysis, we do not believe 
that the outcome of that case controls 
our decision here. See Fishbeck v. Hechler, 85 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 1996), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 
(1995); Hagelin for President Comm. of Kansas v. Graves, 25 F.3d 956 (10th 
Cir. 1994); see also 
Libertarian Party of Washington v. Munro, 31 F.3d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 
1994); Rainbow Coalition of 
Oklahoma v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740, 746 n.9 (10th Cir. 
1988); McLain v. Meier, 
851 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir. 1988); Stevenson v. State Bd. of Elections, 794 
F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (7th Cir. 
1986). But see Hooks, 121 F.3d at 882 (concluding that Anderson governs 
constitutionality of prior version 
of statute).  
 
In Anderson, the Supreme Court invalidated an Ohio election statute that 
required independent presidential 
candidates seeking a place on the November general election ballot to file 
a nominating petition with 5,000 
signatures 75 days before the primary election. 460 U.S. at 808. In 
holding that the statute imposed an 
unconstitutional burden on independent candidates and their voters, the 
Supreme Court found two factors to 
be significant.  
 
First, the Court stressed that the Ohio statute regulated presidential 
elections and not state or local elections. 
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 794. The Anderson Court explained that presidential 
selection procedures "implicate 
a uniquely important national interest" because "the President and the 
Vice President of the United States are 
the only elected officials who represent all the voters in the Nation." 
Id. at 794-95; see also Cousins v. 
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 490 (1975) (announcing the principle that "the 
pervasive national interest in the 
selection of candidates for national office . . . is greater than any 
interest of an individual State"). The Court 
repeatedly emphasized that Ohio's statute interfered with a nationwide 
electoral process. See, e.g., 
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790, 794-96, 804 & 806. Of particular significance, 
the Supreme Court declared 
that "the State has a less important interest in regulating Presidential 
elections than statewide or local 
elections, because the outcome of the former will be largely determined by 
voters beyond the State's 
boundaries." Id. at 795.  
 
Second, the Court noted that the early filing deadline did not apply 
"equally" to all candidates and placed 
independent candidates at a relative disadvantage. Id. at 790-94. 
Independent candidates who failed to file 
by the early filing deadline (in 1980, by March 20) could not appear on 
the Ohio general election ballot, but 
the candidates selected by the major parties at their conventions in late 
summer, even if they had notfiled 
nominating petitions and had not participated in the Ohio primary, were 
guaranteed a spot on the general 
election ballot. Id. at 790-91. Thus, minor parties were locked into their 
selection of candidates by the early 
spring, whereas the major parties retained the flexibility to react to 
changing events by nominating candidates 
who did not emerge until months later. Id. at 790-91 n.11. In addition, 
the signature-gathering efforts of 
independent candidates were burdened by the early filing deadline. Id. at 
792. Signatures had to be gathered 
when "the primary campaigns [were] far in the future," and therefore 
volunteers were difficult to recruit, and 
voters were disinterested. Id. Finding that this scheme"place[d] a 
particular burden on an indentifiable 
segment of Ohio's independent-minded voters," the Court stated:  
 
A burden that falls unequally on new or small political parties or on 
independent candidates impinges, by its 
very nature, on associational choices protected by the First Amendment. It 
discriminates against those 
candidates and -- of particular importance -- against those voters whose 
political preferences lie outside the 
existing political parties. Id. at 792-94.  
 
After finding that the early filing deadline severely burdened the 
independents' associational rights, the Court 
considered the State's articulated justifications: voter education, equal 
treatment, and political stability. Id. at 
796. The Court noted that a State's interest in an informed and educated 
electorate is important and 
legitimate, but the Court concluded that, because of advances in 
communication technology, persons voting 
in the presidential election could receive sufficient information in less 
than five months. Id. at 796-97. The 
Court next rejected the "equal treatment" justification because, even 
though the statute required all parties to 
file a nominating petition if they intended to participate in the primary, 
the consequences of failing to do so 
were drastically different for independents and major parties. Id. at 799. 
Finally, the interest in "political 
stability" was rejected because Ohio's deadline was neither a "sore 
loser"11 nor a "disaffiliation"12 provision 
and was not precisely drawn to protect the parties from "intra-party 
feuding." Id. at 804-05, 804 n.31. The 
Court concluded that the State's proffered justifications were not 
narrowly tailored to advance compelling 
state interests and that these interests were outweighed by the "severe" 
burdens imposed on the independent 
presidential candidates. Id. at 806.  
 
Although the statute in Anderson and the one challenged here undoubtedly 
possess certain similarities, there 
are also important factual differences. For one thing, the statute here 
applies to state and local elections, 
rather than the national presidential election, and therefore the State's 
interest is appreciably greater. In 
addition, the New Jersey statute does not impose a discriminatory burden 
on the alternative political party 
candidates; instead, it favors them by allowing them -- unlike the 
political party candidates -- an additional 
54 days in which to gather signatures. Nor are the political party 
candidates given a preference, 
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11. A "sore loser" candidacy is one in which an individual loses in a 
party primary and then seeks to run in 
the same election as an independent or minor party candidate. Anderson , 
460 U.S. at 784 n.2.  
 
12. A "disaffiliation" provision denies access to the ballot to any 
independent who had voted in a party 
primary or had been registered as a member of a political party within a 
specified period of time prior to the 
immediately preceding primary election. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 726. 
bypass, or "political advantage." 
The New Jersey scheme does not provide a mechanism by which a political 
party candidate who has failed 
to file a timely nominating petition may nevertheless appear on the 
general election ballot. Finally, the statute 
here requires far fewer signatures (100 signatures in most instances, as 
opposed to the 5,000 required in 
Anderson) and imposes a significantly later filing deadline (the day of 
the primary, as opposed to 75 days 
before the primary in Anderson).  
 
In light of these factual differences, we cannot mechanically adopt the 
outcome in that case. Instead, we look 
to Anderson for guidance, but assess the statute's validity in the context 
of the Supreme Court's election 
jurisprudence, including its most recent decision in Timmons, 520 U.S. 
1364.  
 
With this in mind, we turn now to the analysis of whether New Jersey's 
filing deadline imposes an 
unconstitutional burden on plaintiffs' constitutional rights. We begin by 
examining the burdens imposed on the 
plaintiffs, and then consider the State's justifications.  
 
V.  
 
The first step in the analysis prescribed by Anderson is to "consider the 
character and magnitude of the 
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments . . . ." Anderson, 460 U.S. 
at 789. The rights in question are the right to vote, the right to 
associate for political purposes, and the right 
to the equal protection of the laws. Id. at 787. The plaintiffs argue that 
New Jersey's filing deadline (1) 
prevents them from reacting to events occurring after the filing deadline, 
and (2) is substantially more 
burdensome on them than on their political party counterparts and thus 
hinders their ability to obtain "political 
party" status. Appellees' Br. at 36. We conclude, however, that the burden 
imposed in this case, viewed in 
light of the Supreme Court's election jurisprudence, is minimal.  
 
A. Plaintiffs argue that New Jersey's filing deadline burdens them by 
"prevent[ing] alternative political parties 
and their supporters from responding to disaffection with the candidates 
chosen by the recognized political 
parties at their June primaries." Appellees' Supplemental Br. at 2. 
Specifically, they assert that, like in 
Anderson, "voters dissatisfied with the primary results and desiring a 
broader candidate choice cannot work 
together to create such a choice." Id. (citing Hooks, 121 F.3d at 881 
n.5).  
 
Plaintiffs fail to recognize that, unlike in Anderson, they are able to 
respond to the events taking place in the 
political landscape during the 54-day interval between the political party 
and the alternative political party 
deadlines. Therefore, what the plaintiffs wish to enjoy on a permanent 
basis -- and what they obtained in 
1998 under the interim consent order -- is a petition deadline that is 
substantially later than the date of the 
primary, when the major party candidates are nominated. (In 1998, their 
deadline was July 27.) 
Accordingly, what they are seeking cannot be termed equal treatment. On 
the contrary, they are asserting a 
constitutional right to preferential treatment.  
 
Anderson does not support this argument. In that case, independent 
candidate John Anderson's petition, 
although filed after Ohio's filing deadline, was submitted well before the 
major party candidates were 
chosen, and while the Court held that Ohio could not constitutionally 
reject his petition, the Court never 
suggested that Ohio was constitutionally precluded from imposing any 
deadline prior to the conclusion of the 
major party convention.  
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that "some cut off period is necessary," 
American, 415 U.S. at 787 
n.18, and accordingly it has approved of state statutes that require minor 
party candidates to file their 
petitions around the time of the primary election. For instance, in 
Jenness, 403 U.S. at 433-34, the election 
law required independent candidates to submit nominating petitions signed 
byfive percent of the voters in the 
previous election by the second Wednesday in June preceding the November 
general election. See also 
American Party, 415 U.S. at 787 n.18 (stating that "the 120-day pre-
election filing deadline is neither 
unreasonable nor unduly burdensome"); Burdick, 504 U.S. at 437 (giving 
little weight to a candidate's 
interest in "making a later rather than an early decision to seek . . . 
ballot status") (citing Storer, 415 U.S. at 
736 (requiring candidates to be politically disaffiliated for at least one 
year prior to the primary in which they 
seek participation)). Although the Court's holding addressed only whether 
the signature requirements 
imposed an impermissible burden, the Court nonetheless declared that 
Georgia had not"fix[ed] an 
unreasonably early filing deadline for candidates not endorsed by 
established parties." Id. at 438.13 Finding 
the Supreme Court's comment in Jenness relevant, we fail to see how 
plaintiffs can claim they are entitled to 
an even later filing deadline than New Jersey has already provided.  
 
Nor do we see any support in any other Supreme Court decision for the 
plaintiffs' claim of right to 
preferential treatment. Rather, the Supreme Court's election jurisprudence 
suggests that no candidates 
should be given any relative advantage over the other. See Timmons, 520 
U.S. at 1374; Munro, 479 U.S. 
at 198.  
 
Timmons provides an apt illustration. There, the Supreme Court upheld 
Minnesota's ban on fusion, "the 
electoral support of a single set of candidates by two or more parties." 
520 U.S. at 1367 n.1. In doing so, 
the Court rejected the petitioners' argument that without fusion minor 
political parties could not survive. Id. 
at 1371. "The supposed benefits of fusion to minor parties," the Court 
wrote, "does not require that [the 
State] permit it." Id. Although minor parties face many hurdles in 
entering the political arena, the Court 
explained that states are under no duty to alleviate those difficulties. 
Id. Indeed, states have broad power to 
enact reasonable election codes that"may, in practice, favor the 
traditional two-party system."14 Id. at 
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13. Moreover, two circuits have upheld similarfiling deadlines, see, e.g., 
Fishbeck v. Hechler, 85 F.3d 162 
(4th Cir. 1996) (finding primary-eve filing deadline constitutional); 
Hagelin for President Comm. of Kansas 
v. Graves, 25 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1994) (same), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 
1126 (1995), and four circuits 
have upheld filing deadlines imposing substantially earlier deadlines, 
see, e.g., Libertarian Party of 
Washington v. Munro, 31 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 1994); Rainbow Coalition of 
Oklahoma v. Oklahoma State 
Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1988); McLain v. Meier, 851 F.2d 
1045 (8th Cir. 1988); Stevenson 
v. State Bd. of Elections, 794 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1986).  
 
14. Plaintiffs argue that Timmons is not relevant to the present matter 
because it is a voters' rights -- not 
ballot access -- case. The Supreme 1374; see also Munro, 479 U.S. at 198 
("States are not burdened with 
a constitutional imperative to reduce voter apathy or to `handicap' an 
unpopular candidate to increase the 
likelihood that the candidate will gain access to the general election 
ballot.").  
 
Here, any burden imposed does not fall unequally upon the alternative 
political party candidates. See 
American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 784 n.16 (1974) ("It is 
sufficient to note that the system 
does not create or promote a substantial imbalance in the relative 
difficulty of each group to qualify for the 
ballot."); id. at 788 (upholding statute and noting that it provided an 
"essentially equal opportunity" for ballot 
access). Rather, the current version of the statute (unlike its 
predecessor) allows all parties to select their 
candidates on the same date and favors alternative political party 
candidates by allowing them an additional 
54 days in which to file their nominating petitions. If any candidate 
fails to file a nominating petition by the 
requisite deadline, he or she is absolutely denied access to the general 
election ballot, regardless of his or her 
political affiliation. Cf. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790-91 & n.11. To order 
the relief that plaintiffs request 
would tip the scales in their favor and provide them with a relative 
advantage over their political party 
counterparts. We therefore reject the plaintiffs' claim that they are 
constitutionally entitled to file their 
nominating petitions after the major party candidates are chosen so that 
they can recruit and nominate 
candidates who can capitalize on disaffection with the major political 
parties' nominees.  
 
B. Plaintiffs further argue that because of their limited resources and 
small staffs, the statutory requirements 
are substantially more burdensome on them than on their political party 
counterparts and thus hinders their 
ability to achieve "political party" status. Appellees' Br. at 29; see 
also Hooks, 121 F.3d at 880-81. They 
report that "no group other than Democrats and Republicans has qualified 
as `a 
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Court, however, has cautioned that "the rights of voters and the rights of 
candidates do not lend themselves 
to neat separation." Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438. Thus, in this context, 
there is no significant distinction 
between the two. [political] party' in New Jersey since at least 1913." 
Appellees' Br. at 29. We reject this 
argument for several reasons.  
 
First, any connection between the filing deadline-- the feature of the New 
Jersey scheme that is at issue here 
-- and the difficulty of achieving "political party" (i.e., major party) 
status is extremely speculative. As will be 
discussed below, New Jersey's former filing deadline -- which provided 
alternative political party candidates 
fewer days in which to gather signatures than the amended version-- did 
not prevent scores of alternative 
party and independent candidates from securing spots on the general 
election ballot. Therefore, the plaintiffs' 
theory must be that the alternative parties would fare much better in the 
general election (and might obtain 
10% of the vote) if they could select their candidates after the major 
party candidates are chosen, but this 
theory is entirely unproven and seems doubtful.  
 
Second, even if such an effect could be shown, as discussed above, Munro 
and Timmons make clear that 
the Constitution does not impose an affirmative duty upon the states to 
give minor parties preferential 
treatment. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 1374 (commenting that states may enact 
regulations which, "in practice, 
favor the traditional two-party system"); Munro, 479 U.S. at 198 
(emphasizing that states are not "burdened 
with the constitutional imperative . . . to `handicap' an unpopular 
candidate to increase the likelihood that the 
candidate will gain access to the general election ballot").  
 
Third, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a statute's incidental 
effect on a minor party's future 
viability as justification for overturning an otherwise reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory regulation. Timmons, 520 
U.S. at 1371 (upholding statute prohibiting fusion despite plaintiffs' 
argument that without fusion minor 
parties could not enhance their electoral viability). For instance, in 
Munro, 32 minor party candidates 
appeared on the primary ballot. Munro, 479 U.S. at 192. The State then 
enacted a law requiring candidates 
to procure one percent of the primary votes in the preceding election in 
order to be placed on the general 
election ballot. Id. at 196-97. After that change, only one minor party 
appeared on the general election 
ballot, but the Court sustained the restriction, implicitly recognizing 
that a state's interest in protecting the 
integrity of its electoral process may outweigh a minor party's interest 
in ballot access. Id.; cf. Democratic 
Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 126 (1974) (finding unconstitutional a 
statute that enhanced minor party 
viability through broader electoral participation in the selection of 
officials).  
 
Last, the Supreme Court has upheld signature requirements that are 
substantially more onerous. The Court 
has repeatedly recognized that "States may condition access to the general 
election ballot by a minor party 
or independent candidate upon a showing of a modicum of support among the 
potential voters for the 
office." Munro, 479 U.S. at 193; see also American Party v. White, 415 
U.S. 767 (1974) (upholding 
statute requiring minor parties to obtain approximately 400 signatures per 
day within a 55- day period); 
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (upholding Georgia's law requiring 
minor parties tofile a 
nominating petition signed by voters equaling 5% of the votes cast at the 
prior election within a 180-day 
period).  
 
New Jersey's filing deadline is vastly different from that found 
unconstitutionally burdensome in Anderson , 
and even more reasonable than those upheld in Jenness and American. For 
one thing, the burden of 
gathering signatures falls upon all candidates equally. Alternative 
political party candidates, unlike the political 
party candidates, are given an additional 54 days in which to gather 
signatures. Nominating petitions are due 
in early June, during the height of the primary campaign when voters are 
interested and volunteers are willing 
to participate. Candidates must gather a minimal number of signatures, 
they can be solicited from voters of 
any affiliation, and candidates have an unlimited amount of time in which 
to gather signatures. Further, 
candidates unable to satisfy these requirements are afforded the 
opportunity to appear on the ballot through 
the write-in process.15 
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15. Though we recognize that constitutional infirmity cannot be cured by 
the availability of a write-in 
process, Anderson, 460 U.S. at 799 n.26, we nonetheless believe that 
permitting write-in voting allows 
alternative political party candidates and their supporters additional 
opportunities for participating in the 
general election ballot. See Hooks, 121 F.3d at 885 (Scirica, J., 
dissenting). That New Jersey's statutory 
requirements impose only a minimal burden is made clear when one considers 
the plethora of candidates 
who qualified for the general election ballot under the former statutory 
scheme, which imposed an earlier 
filing deadline than the one at issue here. American Party, 415 U.S. at 
787 (discounting argument that 
burden imposed by state is onerous, because"two of the original party 
plaintiffs themselves satisfied the[ ] 
requirements"); Munro, 479 U.S. at 197 n.11 (stating that Washington's 
statute imposed an "insubstantial 
obstacle" on minor party candidates because many such candidates had 
qualified for the ballot); see Storer, 
415 U.S. at 742 (stating that the appropriate question is whether under 
the statutory scheme a "reasonably 
diligent" minor party candidate could gain a place on the State's general 
election ballot); cf. Anderson, 460 
U.S. at 791-92 n.12. In 1997, the State held elections for the 
governorship, the State senate, and the 
general assembly. Despite the early filing deadline, more than 100 
alternative political party candidates 
appeared on the general election ballot after obtaining the requisite 
number of signatures and filing a 
nominating petition on the filing deadline. Of these candidates, eight 
filed petitions for the office of Governor, 
25filed for the State senate, and 68 filed for the general assembly. 
Indeed, five of the individual alternative 
political party candidates in this action -- representing four of the five 
alternative political party plaintiffs -- 
were successful in obtaining a place on that year's general election 
ballot. In previous election years, the 
number of alternative political party candidates appearing on the general 
election ballot for statewide and 
local office was equally numerous: from 1993 through 1996, 231 alternative 
political party candidates were 
able to satisfy the statutory requirements and secure a place on the 
general election ballot.16 In other words, 
the empirical evidence demonstrates that, in fact, diligent alternative 
political party candidates were not 
hindered in their ability to satisfy the statutory requirements and 
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16. Specifically, in 1993, 66 alternative political party candidates 
appeared on the general election ballot; in 
1994, 33 appeared on the ballot; in 1995, 82 appeared on the ballot; and 
in 1996, 50 appeared on the 
ballot. obtain a place on the general election ballot. As the amended 
version provides alternative political 
party candidates an additional 54 days in which to file their nominating 
petitions, it seems likely that a 
substantial number of alternative political party candidates will continue 
to gain access to the general election 
ballot.  
 
In sum, we conclude that New Jersey's filing deadline does not unfairly 
discriminate against the plaintiffs and 
does not "absolutely" or "directly preclude" them from gaining access to 
the ballot. Rather, the deadline is a 
reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation that imposes at most a minimal 
burden on plaintiffs' rights.  
 
VI.  
 
The next step in our analysis is to identify and evaluate the State's 
asserted interests in support of itsfiling 
deadline. The State identifies three such interests: encouraging political 
stability, promoting a fair electoral 
process, and ensuring an informed electorate. Because the burden is not 
severe, the State need not proffer a 
narrowly- tailored regulation that advances a compelling state interest. 
Instead, important regulatory interests 
provide a sufficient justification.  
 
We reject at the outset plaintiffs' argument taking the State to task for 
repeatedly referring to its interests as 
"weighty" but failing to elucidate, through empirical evidence, exactly 
how its interests are promoted by the 
filing deadline. In Munro, the Court reaffirmed the principle that it has 
"never required a State to make a 
particularized showing of the existence of [its articulated interests] 
prior to the imposition of reasonable 
restrictions on ballot access." 479 U.S. at 194-95. The Court further 
explained:  
 
To require States to prove [its articulated interests] . . . as a 
predicate to the imposition of reasonable ballot 
access restrictions would invariably lead to endless court battles over 
the sufficiency of the "evidence" 
marshaled by a State to prove the predicate. Such a requirement would 
necessitate that a State's political 
system sustain some level of damage before the legislature could take 
corrective action. Legislatures, we 
think, should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the 
electoral process with foresight rather 
than reactively . . . .  
 
Id. at 195-96. Thus, the State was not required to proffer empirical 
evidence in support of its articulated 
interests.  
 
A. New Jersey has a strong interest in treating all candidates equally. 
See Hooks, 121 F.3d at 885 (Scirica, 
J., dissenting). The filing deadline provides all candidates with the same 
amount of time to win the nomination 
from their respective parties, and it subjects all candidates 
participating in the general election to voter 
assessment for the same period of time. See Senate State Gov't, Banking & 
Financial Instits. Comm., 
Statement to Senate, No. 1227, State of New Jersey (June 25, 1998), at 3 
(stating that the filing deadline 
"simultaneously identif[ies] all candidates for a political office, both 
party-affiliated and independent, placing 
them on equal footing before the electorate"). Allowing minor parties to 
file on a later date-- after the major 
party's primary -- would give them a significant advantage, and it is 
entirely reasonable for New Jersey to 
regard any such advantage as unfair. Because the Constitution does not 
impose an affirmative duty upon the 
states to "handicap" alternative political party candidates in order to 
facilitate their access to the ballot, see 
Munro, 479 U.S. at 198, it was entirely proper for the State to enact 
legislation that ensures that such a 
result does not occur. We therefore find that the State has proffered an 
important regulatory interest in 
ensuring a fair electoral process.  
 
Plaintiffs argue that the primary-day deadline "cannot be justified as 
serving an interest in equal treatment," 
because "alternative political parties are not permitted to hold 
primaries," and "[o]n primary day, major party 
candidates do not file anything." Appellees' Supplemental Br. at 3. 
However, New Jersey's creation of two 
separate procedural mechanisms for gaining access to the ballot does not 
necessarily mean that candidates 
are treated unequally; nor is this scheme inherently impermissible, 
provided the procedures impose no undue 
burden on minor political parties. American Party, 415 U.S. at 781-82 
(stating that the "procedures [may 
be] different," but the Constitution "does not necessarily forbid the one 
in preference to the other"); Jenness, 
403 U.S. at 441 (explaining that states may establish alternative paths to 
the ballot, "neither of which can be 
assumed to be inherently more burdensome than the other"). As the Supreme 
Court has explained:  
 [T]here are obvious differences in kind between the needs and potentials 
of a political party with historically 
established broad support, on the one hand, and a new or small political 
organization on the other. [A State 
is not] guilty of invidious discrimination in recognizing these 
differences and providing different routes to the 
printed ballot.  
 
Jenness, 403 U.S. at 441-42; id. at 442 (declaring that "sometimes the 
grossest discrimination can lie in 
treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike"). 
Therefore, it is entirely reasonable for 
New Jersey to allow alternative political party candidates to gain access 
to the ballot by way of the petition 
process, while at the same time requiring political party candidates to 
participate in the primary election. See 
Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442 (upholding scheme that required major parties to 
participate in primary, while 
allowing minor parties to gain access through petition process); American 
Party, 415 U.S. at 781- 82 
(upholding scheme that required major party to participate in primary and 
minor party candidates to 
participate by way of convention). Indeed, this statutory scheme, if 
anything, places a heavier burden on the 
political party candidates: Not only must they collect the requisite 
number of signatures, but they must also 
participate in -- and win -- the primary election in order to gain a place 
on the general election ballot. 
Alternative political party candidates, on the other hand, can focus their 
resources and time during the April 
to June interval on gathering signatures rather than preparing for the 
primary, and if they gather the requisite 
number of signatures, they are automatically listed on the general 
election ballot. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 440 
("Surely an argument could as well be made on behalf of [losing primary 
candidates] that it is they who were 
denied equal protection vis-a-vis a candidate who could have had his [or 
her] name printed on the ballot 
simply by filing a nominating petition signed by 5% of the total 
electorate."). We therefore reject plaintiffs' 
argument, and find that New Jersey has advanced a legitimate interest in 
providing an essentially equal ballot 
access mechanism.  
 
B. The State also asserts a legitimate interest in voter education. 
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796 ("There can be 
no question about the legitimacy of the State's interest in fostering 
informed and educated expressions of the 
popular will in a general election."). New Jersey's filing deadline is 
designed to allow primary voters to 
identify and evaluate all candidates in advance of casting their votes at 
the primary election. Because the 
deadline "guarantees that primary voters, when selecting candidates, have 
at least some knowledge of the 
political terrain they are approaching," Cromer, 917 F.2d 819, 832 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (Wilkinson, J., 
dissenting), and insures that they cast an informed and "educated 
expression[ ] of popular will," Anderson, 
460 U.S. at 796, the State's interest is important and legitimate.17  
 
C. Last, the State correctly notes that it has a legitimate interest in 
limiting frivolous candidacies and 
maintaining a stable and efficient election process. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 
803; Storer, 415 U.S. at 736. 
See The Federalist, No. 10 (James Madison) (explaining that splintered 
parties and unrestrained factionalism 
may do significant damage to a state's political structure). By requiring 
all candidates to demonstrate a 
modicum of support before gaining access to the ballot, the filing 
deadline serves important State interests "in 
avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic 
process at the general election." 
Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442; see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432-36. 
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17. Plaintiffs contend that the State's interest in voter education should 
not be considered by the Court 
because it was not articulated by the State but by Judge Scirica in the 
prior appeal. Wefind this argument 
unpersuasive. First, in Timmons, the Court recognized, sua sponte, that 
fusion bans serve the State's interest 
in maintaining a stable two-party system, 520 U.S. at 1374, and second, 
the State raised this interest before 
amendment of the statute. Therefore, the State's interest in voter 
education is properly before us. Cf. Reform 
Party of Allegheny, 1999 WL 171326, at *39-41 n.11 (refusing to hear state 
interest raised for first time at 
oral argument). In addition, by requiring alternative political party 
candidates to file nominating petitions 
before the results of the primary are available, New Jersey's filing 
deadline serves the State's interest in 
preventing "sore loser" candidacies. A "sore loser" candidacy is one in 
which an individual loses in a party 
primary and then seeks to run in the same election as an independent or 
minor party candidate. In Anderson, 
the Court found that Ohio's asserted interest in preventing "sore loser" 
candidacies did not survive strict 
scrutiny because the Ohio statute was really "not a `sore loser' statute," 
460 U.S. at 804 n.31, and because 
the statute was not precisely drawn to effectuate Ohio's alleged aims. Id. 
at 804-05 & n.31.  
 
We agree that here, as in Anderson, the State's interest in preventing 
"sore loser" candidacies is not narrowly 
tailored to effectuate a compelling state interest. We also recognize that 
New Jersey has a disaffiliation 
provision that arguably prevents "sore loser" candidacies.18 Nonetheless, 
we find that New Jersey's interest 
in preventing "sore losers" rises to the level of a legitimate and 
important State interest. Cf. Reform Party of 
Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dep't of Elections, Nos. 97-3359, 96-
3677, 1999 WL 171326, at 
*10-11 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 1999) (en banc) (finding state's interest in 
preventing sore loser candidacies 
insufficient to satisfy heightened scrutiny).  
 
Finally, we reject plaintiffs' contention that New Jersey's filing 
deadline is unconstitutional because it cannot 
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18. That statute provides, in relevant part:  
 
No petition for direct nomination, including a petition filed pursuant to 
R.S. 19:13-19, which, for any reason, 
is filed after the deadline established in R.S. 19:13-9 shall nominate to 
any elective public office a candidate 
who unsuccessfully sought the nomination of a political party to that 
office in the primary election held in the 
same calendar year and no unsuccessful primary candidate shall sign an 
acceptance of such a petition for 
direct nomination .  
 
N.J.S.A. § 19:13-8.1 (emphasis added). This provision prevents "sore 
loser" candidacies, as that term has 
been defined. Even if the deadline for alternative political parties were 
to take place after the June primary, 
unsuccessful primary candidates would not be able tofile a nominating 
petition to run as a candidate for an 
alternative political party. justified based on administrative need. 
Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion, an 
administrative justification is not a sine qua non of the 
constitutionality of election regulations. Where, as 
here, the statute is justified by important and legitimate interests such 
as political stability, a fair electoral 
process, and voter education, those interests alone are sufficient.  
 
VII.  
 
In conclusion, we hold that the State's interests in a fair electoral 
process, voter education, and political 
stability are sufficient to outweigh the small burden imposed upon the 
plaintiffs' rights under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Because we conclude that New Jersey'sfiling 
deadline is a reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory regulation and is justified by New Jersey's important 
regulatory interests, we reverse the 
decision of the District Court.  
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